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Abstract
Since taking office, President Trump has worked hard to undo President Obama’s cli-
mate initiatives. Trump has announced an intention to withdraw from the Paris Agree-
ment, and his appointees at the Environmental Protection Agency have begun pro-
ceedings to undo major climate-related regulations. At each point, Trump’s policies 
have encountered resistance from state and local governments, courts, and major cor-
porations. In particular, governments in many states such as California have increased 
their commitments to addressing climate change. Even the current Republican major-
ity in both houses of Congress, which has generally been loyal to Trump, has shown 
some significant flashes of independence. The courts have shown themselves willing to 
be quite. In short, Trump has already damaged U.S. climate efforts and will continue to 
do so, but the U.S. will nevertheless continue to make progress in some areas.
Keywords: environment law, climate policies, Paris Agreement.
Resumo
Desde que assumiu o cargo, o Presidente Trump trabalhou arduamente para des-
fazer as iniciativas climáticas do Presidente Obama. Trump anunciou a intenção de 
se retirar do Acordo de Paris, e seus nomeados na Agência de Proteção Ambiental 
iniciaram procedimentos para desfazer importantes regulamentações relacionadas 
ao clima. Em cada ponto, as políticas de Trump encontraram resistência de governos 
estaduais e locais, tribunais e grandes empresas. Em particular, os governos de mui-
tos Estados, como a Califórnia, aumentaram seus compromissos para lidar com as 
mudanças climáticas. Até mesmo a atual maioria republicana em ambas as Casas do 
Congresso, que geralmente tem sido fiel a Trump, mostrou alguns flashes significativos 
de independência. Os tribunais mostraram-se dispostos a agir bastante. Em suma, 
Trump já prejudicou os esforços climáticos dos EUA e continuará a fazê-lo, mas os 
EUA continuarão, não obstante isso, a progredir em algumas áreas.
Palavras-chave: direito ambiental, políticas climáticas, Acordo de Paris. 
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Introduction
There are many differences between the views 
of President Donald Trump and those of his predeces-
sor, Barack Obama. One of the most dramatic differ-
ences involves climate change. Obama led many ac-
tions to combat climate change.2 Trump has expressed 
tremendous skepticism about the existence of climate 
change and pledged to increase U.S. production of oil, 
natural gas, and coal. He is attempting to repeal many of 
Obama’s actions.
For those who view climate change as a seri-
ous threat, this change is a cause for dismay and alarm. 
Although the situation may be bad, however, it may 
not be as grim as it seems. The United States is not 
a monolith, and power is divided among different in-
stitutions. There has been major resistance to Trump’s 
efforts across the public and private sectors. As we will 
see, many corporations and state governments had al-
ready begun work to reduce emissions before Trump’s 
election. They have continued that work since the elec-
tion, and they have even intensified it. Moreover, courts 
may reverse some of Trump’s efforts. This article will 
describe those developments.
The President is the most powerful individual 
in the United States, with tremendous power to make 
change. But the U.S. constitutional system diffuses power 
across the different branches of the federal government 
and between the federal and state governments. Presi-
dents have more independence in foreign affairs, but 
presidential actions in the domestic sphere must be able 
to connect a specific congressional enactment with any 
new regulation or the repeal of an existing regulation. 
Meanwhile, Congress and the courts are both autono-
mous actors. State governments have their own elected 
officials and enjoy the power to legislate on any subject 
where they do not conflict with federal law. The private 
sector also has considerable power to take independent 
action so long as they do not violate regulatory prohibi-
tions. The diffusion of initiative and authority among so 
many actors can be frustrating at times, but it also pro-
vides safeguards against ill-advised presidential actions.
The article will proceed in several stages. The 
analysis will begin  by considering how President Trump’s 
views on climate change have been implemented in U.S. 
foreign policy. It is in this arena that he has the most 
scope for independent action in terms of U.S. domes-
tic law. But even here, states and corporations have at-
tempted to reduce the practical impact of his actions. 
The second section then considers how Trump has at-
tempted to roll back domestic regulations issued by the 
Obama Administration. Although Trump has begun the 
process of repeal, completing the necessary procedures 
will take time, and the courts may not approve the results. 
In the third section, the analysis turns to the en-
ergy and climate change policies implemented by state 
and local governments. Some states have undertaken 
broad initiatives to deal with climate change. Others, 
while sharing Trump’s aversion to climate science, have 
nevertheless taken steps to promote renewable energy. 
All of these efforts began before Trump and have con-
tinued despite him.
The fourth section then examines environmen-
tal decisions of the lower courts since Trump’s election. 
The lower courts have continued to uphold climate 
science and have rejected the Administration’s efforts 
to develop fossil fuels without even considering their 
effects on climate change. They also have rejected the 
Administration’s efforts to suspend or delay environ-
mental regulations prior to repealing them. Thus, there 
are no indications that the lower courts are intimidated 
by Trump.
Finally, the last section offers some general conclu-
sions. At each point, Trump’s policies have encountered 
resistance from state and local governments, courts, and 
major corporations. The current Republican majority in 
both houses of Congress, which has generally been loyal 
to Trump, has shown some significant flashes of indepen-
dence. In short, Trump has already damaged U.S. climate 
efforts and will continue to do so, but the U.S. will never-
theless continue to make progress in some areas.
The Paris Agreement
The President has the greatest ability to act in-
dependently in foreign affairs. Thus, President Obama 
was able to join in negotiating the Paris Agreement and 
sign on behalf of the United States, without the sup-
port of Congress, which was controlled by the opposing 
party at the time. The Paris Agreement pledges all of 
the world’s nations to reduce their emissions of green-
house gases in order to combat climate change. Presi-
dent Trump has announced a decision to withdraw the 
United States from this agreement, though he will not 
be able to complete the withdrawal process until near 
the end of his current term in the White House. This ac-
tion has received worldwide attention and strong criti-
cism from other nations (Shear, 2017).
2 For an overview of those efforts, see Hoshijima (2017).
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There has also been a strong reaction within 
the United States against Trump’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement. In an open letter before his deci-
sion, hundreds of businesses urged Trump to stick with 
the Paris Agreement (WWF, 2016). The letter stated 
that “[c]ontinued US participation in the Paris Agree-
ment, in order to provide the long-term direction 
needed to keep global temperature rise below 2°C” 
(WWF, 2016). It also maintained that “[i]mplementing 
the Paris Agreement will enable and encourage busi-
nesses and investors to turn the billions of dollars in 
existing low-carbon investments into the trillions of 
dollars the world needs to bring clean energy and 
prosperity to all” (WWF, 2016). Consequently, these 
businesses said, “[w]e support leaders around the 
world as they seek to implement the Paris Agreement 
and leverage this historic opportunity to tackle climate 
change” (WWF, 2016). The list of companies signing 
the open letter included DuPont, eBay, Nike, Unilever, 
Levi Strauss & Co., Starbucks, General Mills, Hewlett 
Packard and Hilton.
After President Trump announced his intention 
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, many companies 
reacted by announcing their own intentions to cut their 
own emissions despite Trump’s action. This “We’re Still 
In” group condemned Trump’s action and said it “under-
mines a key pillar in the fight against climate change and 
damages the world’s ability to avoid the most dangerous 
and costly effects of climate change” (We are still in, 
2017). The list of signatories includes technology giants 
such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook, along 
with hundreds of smaller firms.3 
Despite Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, major American companies are still mak-
ing vigorous efforts to reduce their carbon emissions. 
With the federal government “missing in action” in the 
battle against climate change, we need to look for other 
options. Some major corporations are taking climate 
change seriously and beginning to address the issues. In 
2016, the Climate Disclosure Project (CDP) reported 
that 638 companies were “proactively planning” for 
climate risk and “are outpacing their governments in 
thinking ahead” and 150 global companies included a 
“shadow price” in their business strategies (CDP, 2015). 
For instance, ConocoPhillips, a global oil company, “uses 
an estimated market cost of greenhouse gas emissions 
in the range of $6 to $51 per tonne (in 2014 uninflated 
terms) depending on the timing and country or region 
to evaluate future project opportunities” (Vandenbergh 
and Gilligan, 2017, p. 33-34).
Similar strategies are used by many companies, 
including others in the oil industry. Industries take vary-
ing approaches. Wells Fargo, a major bank, applies a car-
bon price to the operations of borrowers in consider-
ing credit risks. Microsoft actually charges its business 
groups a small carbon fee and uses the funds to support 
internal efficiency initiatives, green power, and carbon 
offset projects (Vandenbergh and Gilligan, 2017, p. 140). 
It contends that its operations are now carbon-neutral 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2015).
Many corporations made carbon commitments 
prior to the Paris Agreement (Vandenbergh and Gilli-
gan, 2017, p. 177), and over six hundred have joined the 
Ceres climate declaration (Vandenbergh and Gilligan, 
2017, p. 181).4 One revealing statement was from the 
director of global sustainable agriculture at Monsanto, 
who said, “This is directly related to our business... 
We need to provide solutions while farmers are facing 
climate change” (Halper, 2017). Monsanto (now a part 
of Bayer) is on track to be carbon neutral by 2021 
and has long accepted as fact something the Trump ad-
ministration has not: that absent swift action, human-
induced climate change could be catastrophic for busi-
ness (Halper, 2017).
Federal climate regulation
There is no specific statute in the United States 
dealing with climate change. Efforts to pass new legisla-
tion in Congress establishing an emissions trading sys-
tem have not proved successful. Instead, under Obama, 
the government made use of existing authority under 
other statutes to try to address climate change. Trump 
is attempting to undo many of those actions. The legal 
issues are discussed below. We begin an overview of 
Obama’s climate initiatives and then Trump’s efforts to 
roll back those initiatives.
Federal regulation under Obama
To understand Obama’s regulatory initiative, 
some background is necessary. We begin by examin-
ing how the EPA acquired jurisdiction over greenhouse 
gases from a court decision during the Bush Administra-
tion. Following that background material, we will turn to 
the actions of the Obama Administration.
3 For a detailed discussion of the role of initiatives by the private sector in addressing climate change, see Vandenbergh and Gilligan (2017).
4 Further information about this declaration of support for climate action can be found on the Ceres website (Ceres, n.d.).
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Federal authority to regulate  
greenhouse gases
The primary vehicle for addressing climate 
change has been the federal air pollution statute, the 
Clean Air Act. The Supreme Court confronted the is-
sue of EPA’s regulatory authority in Massachusetts v. 
EPA (549 U.S. 497, 2007) Although President George W. 
Bush had endorsed limitations on carbon emissions in 
the 2008 campaign, he reversed course soon after tak-
ing office. During his two terms as President, the federal 
government resisted taking action on climate change. 
The Supreme Court held in an opinion by Justice John 
Paul Stevens, however, that greenhouse gases are con-
sidered “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act and 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must 
regulate them if they endanger human health or welfare. 
By ruling that EPA did have regulatory authority regard-
ing greenhouse gases and that its decision on whether 
to regulate them could only be based on scientific evi-
dence, the Supreme Court’s ruling set EPA on the path 
toward establishing federal climate policy. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the decisive fifth vote 
in this Supreme Court decision, recently retired. It is 
possible, but unlikely, that his more consistently conser-
vative replacement might vote to overrule Massachu-
setts v. EPA. But there are several reasons for thinking 
that the Court will not, in the end, overrule the decision. 
The Court is especially reluctant to overrule past cases 
interpreting statutes, like Massachusetts v. EPA, as op-
posed to constitutional decisions. Moreover, Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts has joined at least one later ruling 
based on Massachusetts v. EPA, and did not join a con-
curring opinion in that case calling for overruling the 
earlier case (see American Electric Power Company 
v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 2011). Without his vote, 
there would not be a majority for overruling. Moreover, 
the late Justice Antonin Scalia took the same position as 
Roberts in the later case, and he remains an icon among 
conservatives. So far, even the Trump Administration has 
no argued for overruling the case. Thus, the possibility 
of an overruling cannot be completely dismissed, but it 
does not particularly likely.
After the Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
directing EPA to base its decision purely on science, 
there was little doubt about how it would ultimately 
rule. The scientific evidence on the link between green-
house gases and climate change is compelling, as is the 
evidence about the risks involved in raising greenhouse 
gas levels in the future. Nevertheless, EPA faced consid-
erable challenges. First, it had to document the science 
in sufficient detail to stand up to attacks from industry 
and conservative state governments in court. Second, 
once EPA had decided to regulate greenhouse gases, it 
had to figure out how to do so within the confines of 
the Clean Air Act. 
The endangerment finding
This first step toward regulation was a finding of 
endangerment. On remand, to no one’s surprise, EPA 
made a formal finding that greenhouse gas emissions 
endanger human health or welfare. Under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, a court probes the decision-
making record to determine whether the agency gave 
a reasoned explanation of its judgment based on the 
evidence in the record. Challengers will attempt to poke 
holes in the agency’s logic or identify evidence that was 
ignored by the agency.5 These challenges came before 
the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. 
v. EPA (684 F.3d 102, D.C. Cir. 2012).6 The challengers 
raised several issues about the EPA finding. First, they 
argued that EPA, in effect, had delegated its judgment 
to other bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the National Research 
Council by relying on their scientific assessments. Clear-
ly, the statute requires EPA to form its own judgment 
rather than blindly adopting the views of some other 
body. But EPA cited a large volume of evidence, not just 
the ultimate conclusions of these expert bodies, so this 
argument was something of a stretch. Indeed, the court 
rejected the argument as “little more than a semantic 
trick”.7 In reality, the court said, EPA had merely made 
normal use of the existing scientific literature, and care-
fully evaluated the quality of these sources before rely-
ing on them.
Second, the challengers argued that the scientific 
evidence in the record did not support the finding of 
endangerment. The court carefully recounted the ba-
sis for this finding in the scientific evidence, concluding 
that there was substantial evidence that climate change 
endangers health and welfare. The court stressed that 
the statute “requires a precautionary, forward-looking 
scientific judgment”, so as “to prevent reasonably an-
5 The basic rules governing judicial review of agency action are explained in Pierce Jr. et al. (2013, p. 115-120, 317-354).
6 The Supreme Court granted review on another issue in the case and reversed in part on that issue in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
7 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 2014, at 120.
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ticipated endangerment from maturing into concrete 
harm”.8 It is worth noting that this approach resonates 
with the Precautionary Principle found in international 
environmental law, though the court did not say so.
The Supreme Court agreed to review other as-
pects of the decision of the court of appeals. However, 
it denied the request to review the endangerment find-
ing. Consequently, that finding remains unchallenged. Al-
though Scott Pruitt, who headed EPA under Trump until 
he resigned in July of 2018, attempted to shed doubt on 
the climate science underlying the endangerment find-
ing, he did not attempt to repeal the finding.
Obama-era regulations
Once it had decided to make a finding of en-
dangerment, EPA was then faced with the question of 
how to go about using the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gases. This was a relatively straightforward 
issue legally in terms of vehicle emissions. Section 202 
required EPA to impose standards for emissions from 
new motor vehicles once it had found endangerment, 
and EPA proceeded to do so without any huge difficulty. 
The car industry was already under pressure because of 
regulations adopted in California, so EPA was not writ-
ing on a blank slate.9 This regulation was upheld by the 
court of appeals, and the Supreme Court declined to 
consider the issue. 
But it was more difficult for EPA to know how to 
approach emissions from stationary sources like power 
plants and factories. As the first stage in dealing with 
these stationary sources, EPA used a provision of the 
Clean Air Act that requires any new “major emitting 
facility” to use the “best available control technology 
[BACT] for each pollutant subject to regulation under 
this chapter emitted from, or which results from, such 
facility” (42 U.S.C. § 7475, a; 2010b). EPA decided that 
greenhouse gas limits applied to any new facility that 
was considered a major source due to the quantity of 
pollutants other than greenhouses. The Supreme Court 
upheld this part of the regulation. 
This left with the question of how to define cov-
erage for sources that emit large amounts of greenhouse 
gases, but not enough of other pollutants to make them 
major sources. The problem is that the quantity defini-
tion used in the statute work well to distinguish major 
from minor sources in terms of other pollutants, but 
would cover many fairly minor sources of greenhouse 
gases. The statute defines a major source as one that 
emits 100 or 200 tons of a pollutant, depending on the 
type of source.10 These amounts are very substantial in 
terms of most pollutants, so that only large factories, 
refineries, or electrical generators are covered. But this 
is actually a fairly small amount of carbon dioxide, so ap-
plying this definition to greenhouse gases would mean 
that thousands of small facilities were covered. For that 
reason, EPA decided to define major sources as a nar-
rower category when the only basis for coverage was 
the emission of large amounts of greenhouse gases. 
It said that for purposes of the regulation, those sourc-
es would be covered only if they emitted thousands of 
tons, far more than the amount of pollutant that the 
statute defined as major. By attempting to modify the 
definition contained within the statute to cover only a 
narrower category of sources, EPA knew it was taking 
a major legal risk.
EPA lost the gamble. The Supreme Court re-
versed that part of the regulation in Utility Air Regulatory 
Group [UARG] v. EPA (134 S.Ct. 2427, 2014).11 In an opin-
ion by Justice Scalia, the Court concluded that the agen-
cy should have realized its narrow definition of major 
facilities was completely untenable because it conflicted 
with the statutory definition. EPA “lacked authority to 
‘tailor’ the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds 
to accommodate its greenhouse-gas-inclusive inter-
pretation of the permitting triggers” (134 S.Ct. 2014, 
p. 2448). “Instead”, Justice Scalia continued, “the need 
to rewrite clear provisions of the statute should have 
alerted EPA that it had taken a wrong ‘interpretative’ 
turn” (134 S.Ct. 2427, 2014, p. 2448). Given that EPA’s 
numerical revision was invalid, its applying the statute to 
sources based solely on their carbon emissions would 
mean coverage for “millions of small sources—includ-
ing retail stores, offices, apartment buildings, shopping 
centers, schools, and churches” (134 S.Ct. 2427, 2014, 
p. 2446). The Court rejected such an “enormous and 
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority 
without clear congressional authorization” (134 S.Ct. 
2427, 2014, p. 2444). Four Justices dissented from this 
part of the opinion (134 S.Ct. 2427, at 2449, Breyer, J., 
dissenting). However, the as noted above, the Court 
concluded that EPA was correct that once a source is 
classified as “major” because of its emission of conven-
8 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 2014, at 121.
9 For background on the process behind the issuance of the regulations, see Freeman (2011).
10 The definition is found in 42 U.S. C. § 7479(1).
11 For discussion of the implications of the Court’s ruling, see Carlson and Herzog (2015).
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tional pollutants, it must also use BACT for greenhouse 
gases. Thus, the upshot was that only sources that would 
already have been classified as major are required to use 
best available control technology to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions.
In a separate opinion, Justices Alito and Thomas 
argued that Massachusetts v. EPA had erred in holding 
that the Clean Air Act covers greenhouse gases (134 
S.Ct. 2427, at 2445, Alito, J., dissenting). But only two 
Justices joined that position; the other seven Justices 
remained firmly committed to applying the statute to 
greenhouse gases as a general matter. Indeed, the dis-
sent only highlighted the fact that two of the four origi-
nal dissenters in Massachusetts v. EPA (Scalia and Rob-
erts) had conceded EPA’s jurisdiction over greenhouse 
gases. Even after Scalia’s replacement, Justice Gorsuch 
replaced Scalia, there was still a six person majority to 
uphold at least some EPA climate regulations. The ap-
pointment of a more conservative Justice to replace 
Justice Kennedy seemingly leaves a 5-4 majority in favor 
of classifying greenhouse gases as pollutants and for re-
quiring controls for major new plants.
The UARG decision did not have a dramatic im-
pact on the effectiveness of the PSD rules, because at 
least eighty-five percent of greenhouse gases come from 
facilities that are considered “major” because of their 
emissions of other pollutants like sulfur dioxide. As yet, 
the Trump Administration has not attempted to repeal 
PSD coverage for “anyway” plants. Perhaps the reason 
is the fact that the rule has already been upheld by the 
courts, which makes it more difficult to make a cogent 
case for repeal. Or perhaps the reason is an assumption 
that, in the absence of pressure from EPA, states (which 
have primary responsibility for permitting) may not find 
it hard to issue fairly toothless permits.
After issuing this regulation, the Obama EPA 
issued standards covering new electric power genera-
tors under section 111 of the statute (42 U.S.C. § 7411, 
2010a). Section 111(b) authorizes EPA to issue limita-
tions for pollutants from new plants, and EPA did so 
for electric power plants. In order to regulate existing 
power plants—especially existing coal-fired plants—
EPA turned to section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (42 
U.S.C. § 7411, d), a previously obscure provision. Sec-
tion 111(d) provides that EPA can require states to 
submit plans to control emissions from existing plants 
after it has issued a standard for new sources. The state 
plans are based on the best “system of continuous 
emission reduction” (BSER) that has been “adequately 
demonstrated” in terms of existing plants in that state. 
A crucial issue involved the scope of the term “system”—
does it include only plant specific emission limitations 
measures, or could a system be defined more broadly to 
include things like replacing coal with renwables?
The Obama Administration decided to define 
the “system” of electrical power generation broadly un-
der section 111(d). Its regulation is known as the Clean 
Power Plan. (Federal Register, 2015) In the best stan-
dard of performance, the Obama EPA looked at emis-
sion reduction strategies that could be applied to the 
grid, such as increased use of renewable energy. Defining 
the system of pollution control to encompass changes 
in the amount of electricity introduced into the grid is 
a departure for EPA, which normally defines it as a type 
of pollution control equipment at the specific emitting 
facility12. The Clean Power Plan was fiercely attacked by 
industry and conservative leaders. It was a prime target 
of the Trump Administration.
Trump’s efforts to roll back regulation
The Trump Administration has been under some 
pressure from the conservatives to reopen the endanger-
ment finding, but as yet, EPA has not done so, apparently 
because of concerns about the litigation risks involved. 
Thus, the endangerment finding remains unchallenged. 
So far, there seems to have been no discussion of repeal-
ing the PSD permitting requirement for new plants. 
Repealing a federal regulation is a lengthy process 
that requires exactly the same steps as creating a new 
regulation. Under the Clean Air Act (42 USC § 7607, 
2010c), in order to issue or repeal a regulation, EPA 
must make a detailed proposal explaining the grounds 
for the action and must all reveal all of the evidence 
it will rely on to justify the regulation. It also conducts 
a cost-benefit analysis, which must be approved by the 
White House. The public then has an opportunity to 
comment on the proposal, in writing and often at public 
hearings. Finally, the Administration must issue a detailed 
justification for its final decision, including its reasons for 
rejecting significant criticisms of its proposal.
The Administration has opened a proceeding to 
modify the next phase of greenhouse gas vehicle re-
quirements in order to limit costs of industry, but this 
proceeding is still at an early stage (Eilperin and Dennis, 
2018). It has also made public a proposal to repeal the 
Clean Power Plan (82 Fed. Reg. 48039).
12 For discussion of this issue, see DeBellis (2015).
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In its proposal for repealing the Clean Power 
Plan, the Trump Administration adopted an industry ar-
gument that the plan is invalid because EPA is limited 
to considering actions that can be implemented solely 
within the fence line of an individual emitter, such as 
installing new pollution control equipment. Recall that, 
in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the Plan 
would require utilities to scale back electricity genera-
tion at coal-fired plants in favor of generators using nat-
ural gas or renewable sources (see 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 
et seq.). In other words, according to the Trump Admin-
istration, section 111(d) authorizes the agency to im-
pose efficiency improvements for coal-fired plants but 
not to require that the electricity output of a coal-fired 
plant be reduced in favor of other sources of electricity. 
This interpretation of the statute is the basis of EPA’s 
justification for proposing to completely repeal the Plan 
(82 Fed. Reg. 48039-43). 
Trump has also attempted to undo a number of 
other Obama-era climate initiatives besides the vehicle 
standards and the Clean Power Plan. One of these ini-
tiatives involves the social cost of carbon, an estimate 
of the amount of harm done by emission of one addi-
tional ton of carbon. The Obama Administration created 
such an estimate by using the most widely cited models 
used by economists.13 Those models combine a climate 
change decided to focus on the global impacts of carbon. 
The Obama Administration then used various discount 
rates, a crucial factor in calculating the social cost of 
carbon, to provide a range of estimates. The Trump Ad-
ministration rescinded this estimate of the social cost of 
carbon and later did its own calculation (Mooney, 2017). 
The new calculation considers only the direct harm of 
climate change in the United States and uses a high dis-
count rate, which results in giving long-term harms from 
climate change very little weight. Thus, Trump’s estimate 
essentially includes only harm within the United States 
within the next few decades. Naturally, this estimate is 
much lower than Obama’s.
Another initiative involves the vehicle emissions 
standards discussed in the previous section.  Those stan-
dards are scheduled to become increasingly strict for 
the next several years. The Administration has proposed 
freezing the standards at their current levels (Daven-
port and Tabuchi, 2018). Such a regulatory action could 
cause problems for car manufacturers, because Califor-
nia still has its own standards for vehicle carbon emis-
sions (Davenport and Tabuchi, 2018). Consequently, the 
manufacturers have opposed freezing the standard and 
urged the Administration to negotiate a compromise 
with California (Reuters, 2018).
One notable positive development is found in a 
funding law for the Defense Department. Section 335 
of the Defense Authorization Act of 2018 (HR 2810) 
states that it is the sense of Congress that “climate 
change is a direct threat to the national security of the 
United States and is impacting stability in areas of the 
world both where the United States Armed Forces are 
operating today, and where strategic implications for fu-
ture conflict exist”. It also says that sea level rise “will 
threaten the operations of more than 128 United States 
military sites, and it is possible that many of these at-risk 
bases could be submerged in the coming years”. And 
moreover, section 335 says, “As global temperatures 
rise, droughts and famines can lead to more failed states, 
which are breeding grounds of extremist and terror-
ist organizations”. Thus, Congress has clearly identified 
ways in which foreign impacts in turn impose domestic 
costs on the U.S., which a cost-benefit analysis should 
not ignore. This may make it harder for the Trump Ad-
ministration to justify ignoring global impacts.
Congress also resisted Trump’s efforts to slash 
the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency 
and fire many of its staff members as well as eliminating 
funding for most research on climate change and renew-
able energy. In the 2018 budget bill passed by Congress, 
“[t]he Environmental Protection Agency was one of the 
few parts of the government that did not receive a sub-
stantial spending bump in the package, but the measure 
kept funding for the agency essentially flat at $8.1 billion, 
rejecting the 30 percent cut sought by Mr. Trump and 
Scott Pruitt, the administrator” (Davis, 2018). The bud-
get bill also rejected Trump’s proposal to eliminate the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energ and instead 
gave it around a fifteen percent increase, while maintain-
ing current funding levels for climate change research at 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) (Science News, 2018).
Overall, it is too early to know how successful 
Trump’s deregulatory efforts will be. EPA will undoubt-
edly issue many decisions repealing prior regulations 
by the Obama Administration. EPA will need to finish 
the process of issuing the decisions, which will probably 
take until the end of 2018 if not longer, and then the 
litigation process will take additional time. It will prob-
ably be one to two years later that the courts decide. 
They may uphold some of the decisions, reject some 
of them entirely, and send some back to the agency for 
13 For a detailed discussion of the Obama Administration’s estimate, see Farber (2015).
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further consideration. But as we will see in the next 
section, state governments are not waiting to see this 
process unfold before taking their own actions to ad-
dress climate change.
State climate initiatives
State governments have plenary legislative pow-
ers in the absence of any prohibition by federal law. In 
some areas, such as regulation of local electrical utili-
ties, they have customarily had the primary responsibil-
ity. States have used these powers to pursue their own 
energy policies. We will begin by seeing what they were 
already doing before Trump and then how they have re-
sponded to his election.
Pre-Trump Efforts
State governments have played a surprisingly ac-
tive role in regulating carbon emissions.14 Among the 
states that are addressing climate change in meaningful 
ways, California has played a leading role. California’s ac-
tion on climate change dates began in 1988 with legisla-
tion mandating an inventory of California greenhouse 
gas emissions.15 In 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger signed the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 
usually referred to as AB 32,16 which requires California 
to reduce emissions to the 1990 level by 2020. The Cali-
fornia effort received worldwide attention because the 
Governor was an international celebrity and because 
it was such a stark contrast with the Bush Administra-
tion’s refusal to address climate change. California has 
now actively entered into discussions with a number of 
foreign government, including China.  
California implemented AB 32 aggressively. The 
law itself is notably brief and gives the government 
enormous discretion about how to achieve its goals, 
though it does rule out a carbon tax. The California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) first developed nine “early 
action” measures, some of which focus on reducing 
emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. One impor-
tant early action was a mandate to reduce the car-
bon intensity of transportation fuels by ten percent 
by 2020.17 But the CARB’s most important action was 
to establish an emissions trading system. The program 
originally covered about six hundred industrial facili-
ties, with fuel distributors having been added to the 
program more recently. California’s cap-and-trade pro-
gram sets a declining, statewide cap on greenhouse 
gas emission. Many allowances have been distributed 
free to firms, but an increasing percentage will be auc-
tioned. The auctions have already begun to generate 
significant amounts of revenue for the state. In 2016, 
California passed SB 32, which set a new 2030 target 
of emissions forty-percent below 1990 emissions.18 
The ultimate goal of many California policymakers is 
an eighty percent reduction by 2050.
States have also combined efforts in regional 
programs (see Engel, 2005). The most important is the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is 
currently composed of eleven states. RGGI created a 
multistate trading system for power plant emissions with 
the goal of achieving a ten percent reduction by 2019 
(see RGGI, 2018). In 2013, the cap was reset to ninety-
one million tons of carbon, down from 165 million tons. 
A quarter of the proceeds are auctioned, with the pro-
ceeds going to finance energy efficiency programs or 
reduce fee hikes caused by the program. Indeed, many 
of the carbon reductions associated with the program 
have stemmed from these energy efficiency programs 
rather than from the cap itself. The allowance prices re-
main low, indicating that the cap is still generous, but the 
cap is set to decline by 2.5 percent annually.19
In another example of independent state action, 
the Western Governor’s Association (2018) recently 
passed a bipartisan policy statement related to meth-
ane, a powerful greenhouse gas. The statement says that 
methane is “a potent greenhouse gas emitted from a 
variety of sources, including oil and gas operations, coal 
mines, landfills, agriculture, and natural sources” (West-
ern Governor’s Association, 2018). Thus, the statement 
continues, “[t]here are environmental and economic 
benefits of reducing methane emissions and opportu-
nities for the beneficial use of this natural resource”. 
Consequently, the statement calls for federal methane 
regulation to “(1) ensure that the capture, commoditiza-
tion, and sale of methane is promoted; (2) give states 
the flexibility to integrate a variety of technologies and 
14 For an overview, see Engel (2016).
15 AB 4420 (Sher), Chapter 1506, Statutes of 1988 (California Legislative Information, 2010b).
16 AB 32 (Nunez), Chapter 488, California Statutes of 2006, codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500 et seq. (California Legislative Information, 2010a).
17 This provision was upheld against a claim that it discriminated against biofuel producers in other states. See Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey (730 F.3d 1070, 
1107, 2013).
18 For the SB 32 text, see California Legislative Information (2016).
19 For discussion of the legal issues raised by state efforts to limit carbon emissions, see Freeman (2017).
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tools to achieve methane emission reduction standards; 
(3) recognize methane emissions reductions that result 
from existing state regulation of volatile organic com-
pounds; and (4) work with states to ensure the consis-
tent use of a single, clear method of quantifying methane 
emissions” (Western Governor’s Association, 2018). 
This statement is especially noteworthy because the As-
sociation contains governors of all the Western States, 
including many conservative Republicans.
In addition to actions at the state level, many 
cities have adopted climate action plans.20 Although 
cities do not have the same extensive regulatory 
powers as state governments, some specific aspects 
of emission reduction directly relate to municipal ac-
tivities. Efforts by city governments have taken many 
forms. Urban planning and land use control is an im-
portant municipal function with important implications 
for climate change. For instance, cities may use their 
building codes to encourage more energy-efficient 
buildings and their transit planning to promote public 
transportation. One area of interest is promotion of 
transportation-oriented development, where the goal 
is to promote additional development close to public 
transportation hubs. Cities can also reduce barriers to 
the use of renewable energy, such as zoning restric-
tions that could hinder rooftop solar. 
In addition, city governments can reduce their 
own energy use and can adopt renewable sources of 
energy, such as generating electricity from methane pro-
duced by waste. Municipalities own a significant number 
of buildings as well as vehicles such as police cars, so 
potential emissions reductions are not trivial. Finally, a 
number of cities run their own municipal electrical utili-
ties, which sometimes have adopted ambitious renew-
able energy and energy efficiency programs. Given the 
proportion of the population and the economy found in 
urban areas, these are not necessarily insignificant steps.
The reaction to Trump
In the aftermath of Trump’s election, several 
state governments have actually increased their efforts 
to combat climate change. For instance, New Jersey im-
mediately rejoined RGGI when its Republican governor 
was replaced with a Democrat in the 2017 election by 
a Democrat (see Maloney, 2018). In California, as noted 
earlier, the legislature adopted a new target in SB 32: 
reducing emissions thirty-percent below 1990 levels by 
2030. But the question remained how to reach this goal. 
In 2017, the California legislature adopted AB 398 by a 
two-thirds vote, extending the emissions trading sys-
tem until 2030.21 
Rather than using cap-and-trade, Washington 
adopted the “trade” but not the “cap”, in a distinctive 
hybrid of conventional regulation and emissions trading. 
The state’s Clean Air Rule went into effect in January 
2017.22 The rule requires major emitters of greenhouse 
gases to limit and reduce carbon pollution and incentiv-
izes investments to reduce fossil fuel use and acceler-
ate use of clean energy. Unlike California, Washington 
did not set a statewide cap on emissions. Instead, each 
facility is assigned its own emission reduction pathway, 
using its average emissions in 2012-2016 as a baseline. 
Thereafter, emissions must decrease at a rate of 1.7% 
per year. Every three years, a facility must demonstrate 
that it met its reduction goals or face penalties. There 
is also a reserve of emission reduction units (ERUs) to 
accommodate new facilities.23 The state allows trading 
of ERUs and says that trading will also be allowed with 
out-of-state programs when those are approved.
New York has also strengthened its approach 
to climate change in 2017.24 In May 2017, Governor 
Andrew Cuomo announced a plan to cut methane 
emissions. In June, he announced that New York was 
joining the U.S. Climate Alliance. He had this to say on 
that occasion:
New York State is committed to meeting the stan-
dards set forth in the Paris Accord regardless of Wash-
ington’s irresponsible actions. We will not ignore the 
science and reality of climate change, which is why I 
am also signing an Executive Order confirming New 
York’s leadership role in protecting our citizens, our 
environment, and our planet.25
In the first half of 2018, there were even more 
actions strengthening state climate and renewable en-
ergy policies. Consider the following, all within a six-
month period: 
20 For an overview of what cities are doing, see Rosenzweig and Solecki (2018).
21 For the AB 398 text, see California Legislative Information (2018).
22 Washington State Department of Ecology (2016). The rule has been challenged in court by several generators and utilities (US News, 2017).
23 In effect, the sum of the targets for all individual plants still in operation plus the ERUs from the reserve fund is equivalent to a statewide emissions cap, but the state 
never sets an explicit target for statewide emissions.
24 On the current status of New York’s renewable energy program, see New York State Energy Plan (2017).
25 “Governor Andrew M. Cuomo Signs Executive Order and Commits New York to Uphold the Standards Set Forth in the Paris Accord,” Governor Andrew M. Cuomo 
(Governor New York, 2017).
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•		California passed legislation requiring solar 
power for all new homes (Penn, 2018).
•		Colorado adopted California’s car standards, in-
cluding greenhouse gas standards (Elliott, 2018).
•		Connecticut adopted new laws requiring utili-
ties to get forty percent of their power from 
renewable sources by 2030 and mandating that 
the state cut greenhouse gases forty-five per-
cent below 2001 levels by 2030 and requiring 
that government-funded coastal projects take 
into account a projected sea rise of two feet 
by 2050 (Cummings, 2018).
•		Florida changed its rules to allow long-term 
leasing of rooftop solar installations to con-
sumers (Bloomberg Environment, 2018).
•		Hawaii passed new legislation that rewards 
utilities for increasing the use of distributed 
resources like rooftop solar (Mulkern, 2018).
•		Illinois regulators approved a pathway to twen-
ty-five percent renewables by 2025.
•		New Jersey’s Governor signed an executive or-
der rejoining the RGGI regional carbon trading 
system (Maloney, 2018). He also signed new 
legislation increasing the renewable energy 
mandate to thirty-five per by 2025 and fifty 
percent by 2030, with special provisions for 
solar and offshore wind (Roberts, 2018). The 
law also provides a subsidy for nuclear plants.
•		New York committed $1.4 billion to twenty-
two renewable energy projects (Geuss, 2018).
•		Virginia’s governor vetoed a bill that would 
have prevented him from using an executive 
order to rejoin an interstate emissions trad-
ing system or create a state emissions trading 
system (Governor Virginia, 2018).
Thus, rather than dampening state efforts to re-
duce carbon emissions, Trump may actually have given 
them additional momentum. It is notable that these 
states not only continued their existing climate policies 
after Trump but have also strengthened them. Thus, cli-
mate policy may be under attack at the federal level, but 
it is continuing to thrive in some important states. 
Moreover, renewable energy has also continued 
to expand even in conservative states that do not have 
any policies addressing climate change. For instance, 
the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), 
which operates most of that state’s grid, recently pro-
jected that in the next fifteen years, Texas will add al-
most 20 gigawatts (GW) of solar, equivalent to 15-20 
new nuclear reactors (ERCOT, 2016). In fact, under vir-
tually every scenario ERCOT considered, the only new 
capacity is solar, with no new fossil fuel plants expect-
ed. ERCOT also expects to retire about a third of that 
amount in coal generation together with some older, 
inefficient natural gas plants. As the Texas example il-
lustrates, cheap natural gas and renewables are pushing 
coal power plants out of operation across the United 
States, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.26
The courts
The federal courts have not surrendered to the 
Trump Administration’s view of climate policy. They have 
continued to apply the law objectively and to require 
agencies to base their decisions on sound science. Only 
a few cases have reached the courts so far, but they pro-
vide some reason for hope that the courts will resist 
Trump Administration actions that lack legal justification. 
In two recent cases, the courts have considered 
the role of climate change in government decisions. 
For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that the government was required to con-
sider climate change impacts when issuing coal leases.27 
This ruling will make it harder for the Administration 
in other issues involving fossil fuels. The agency argued 
that the coal leases would not affect global emissions 
because they would simply substitute for coal mined 
elsewhere. The plaintiffs argue, on the basis of simple 
economics, that increasing the supply of coal would in-
crease demand, resulting in more total mining. In reject-
ing the agency’s analysis, the court that it was an abuse 
of discretion to rely on an economic assumption that 
contradicted basic economic principles. The court also 
went out of its way to rebut the agency’s claim that 
climate change is an issue “on the frontiers of science,” 
entitling the agency to special deference. 
In a second case involving climate effects, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld a decision by the Obama Admin-
istration to classify the Arctic ringed seal as endangered 
due to climate change, despite the Trump Administra-
tion’s skepticism about climate science.28 The court said 
that the finding “that the Arctic ringed seal was likely 
to become endangered within the foreseeable future—
26 For a survey of renewable energy policies across the United States, see Farber (2018).
27 WildEarth Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land Management (870 F.3d 1222, 10th Cir., 2017c).
28 Alaska Oil and Gas Association v. Ross (F.3d, 2018 WL 821866, 9th Cir., 2018a).
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was reasonable and supported by the record” (United 
States, 2018a). Noting that IPCC climate models showed 
the seals’ habitat to be shrinking as sea ice recedes, the 
court strongly endorsed those models as “the best 
available science” and said they “reasonably suppor[t] 
the determination that a species reliant on sea ice likely 
would become endangered in the foreseeable future” 
(United States, 2018a).
In several other cases, the courts have strongly 
resisted efforts by the Trump Administration to delay or 
suspend regulations from the Obama era. For instance, 
the D.C. Circuit reversed the Trump Administration’s 
suspension of an EPA rule limiting methane emissions 
from oil and gas operations. This ruling is noteworthy 
because it limits the ability of the Administration to get 
rid of existing rules without going through a formal rule-
making process. The court rejected EPA’s arguments 
that it had inherent authority to suspend rules and that 
its attempt to base the suspension on a specific provi-
sion of the statute was flatly contradicted by the record 
(Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, D.C. Cir., 2017a).
Although they did not involve climate change, 
two other recent cases illustrate the courts’ willing-
ness to reverse administrative delaying tactics. In one 
of these cases, the Ninth Circuit demanded that EPA 
move promptly to resolve a rule making regulating lead 
paint. Since delay is one of the most insidious forms of 
deregulation, this decision is significant as an indication 
that judges are unwilling to tolerate indefinite foot-
dragging. The court put heavy pressure on the agency 
to move forward, directing it to issue a proposed rule 
within ninety days and a final rule within six months” 
(In re Community Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 9th Cir. 2017b).
In another, even more recent case, the Second 
Circuit reprimanded the Trump Administration for 
another effort to delay regulations.29 In this case, the 
regulation was a major increase in the amount of the 
civil penalty paid by car companies for violating rules 
governing fuel efficiency. The court held that the effort 
to delay the penalty increase pending reconsideration 
had no statutory basis and was also invalid because the 
government had failed to give notice of the proposal 
to delay the increase and an opportunity for the public 
to comment. Although these rulings on regulatory delay 
did not deal with climate change, it does show the will-
ingness of courts to intervene against Trump’s actions.
There is little indication that the courts will 
be deferential to the Trump Administration’s actions. 
Undoubtedly the Administration will win some cases in 
court. But even with a potentially more conservative 
Supreme Court (given the replacement of Justice Ken-
nedy), the courts may be significant barriers to other 
efforts by the Administration. 
Conclusions and lessons learned
Trump’s election may put in danger much of the 
progress made under Obama in addressing environ-
mental issues and even risk some earlier accomplish-
ments. This was not the very first time that a president 
favoring climate action was replaced with one opposing 
regulation: the same thing happened when George W. 
Bush succeeded Bill Clinton. The Bush years provided 
a blueprint that still largely applies. Environmentalists 
were able to use a three-part strategy to deal with the 
anti-environmental pressures in D.C., and those tools 
remain available.
The first approach under Bush was to use what-
ever political leverage was available at the national level 
to block anti-environmental moves. This included using 
the Senate where possible to block legislative initia-
tives, and lobbying heavily on individual issues. This has 
remained a definite possibility, considering the Repub-
lican’s narrow margin in the Senate and the ability of a 
minority to use the Senate’s procedural rules to delay 
action. Moreover, if the Democrats succeed in taking 
the House of Representatives in the 2018 congressional 
elections, they will have the ability to block anti-environ-
mental regulation.
The second approach under Bush was to use the 
courts. The replacement of Justice Kennedy by a more 
conservative judge increases the likelihood that the 
Court will uphold some of Trump’s efforts to repeal cli-
mate change regulations. But the Supreme Court hears 
relatively few cases a year. The lower courts have a large 
number of Obama appointees and should be more sym-
pathetic overall. National environmental organizations 
will play a critical role in litigating these cases, as will 
sympathetic state governments.
The final approach under Bush was to press for-
ward as much as possible at the state level. California 
passed AB 32; the Northeastern states moved forward 
with RGGI; and many other states worked hard on is-
sues like renewable energy. Because Republican control 
of state governments had increased in the meantime, 
this strategy under Trump has focused primarily on the 
regions where Democrats remains strong, such as the 
West Coast and the Northeast. The elections in No-
29 Natural Resources Defense Council v. National Highway Safety Administration (F.3d, 2d Cir., 2018b).
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vember 2018 may give the Democrats an opportunity 
to expand their power among the states, along with new 
climate initiatives. 
In short, while the Trump Administration poses 
a serious threat to global efforts to address climate 
change, Trump does not speak for the entire United 
States.  Many influential institutions, including state gov-
ernments, continue to take climate change serious and 
work to address the issue.
Trump’s election was a surprise. What should 
not be a surprise is the inevitability of political setbacks 
for climate policy. We saw that in the U.S. with the shift 
from Clinton to Bush and then from Obama to Trump. 
We also saw something similar in Australia and Ontar-
io, where it meant the repeal of a promising emissions 
trading system. Even if climate denial is banished from 
the scene, we can expect to see fluctuations in enthusi-
asm for climate policy. How can we design climate poli-
cies to be sturdy in the face of shifting political currents? 
As the U.S. has seen under both Bush and Trump, 
one basis for robustness is to diversify the political bod-
ies involved in climate policy, making it less likely that 
they will reverse themselves simultaneously.  In the U.S., 
this has primarily meant state climate and energy policy. 
The Center for Law, Energy, and Environment has issued 
a fifty-state survey that reveals just how much has been 
done in this space, even in deeply Republican states 
(Farber, 2018). As we saw in the fourth, these trends 
have continued under Trump.
Even within a single level of government, to the 
extent that climate-related measures become part of 
different regulatory schemes with different administra-
tors, the logistics of rolling back those policies become 
more difficult. In addition, dispersed policies may cre-
ate non-environmental constituencies. For instance, if 
renewable policies become embedded in utility regula-
tion, they can create constituencies such as renewable 
generators even in places otherwise inhospitable to en-
vironmental regulations. The Obama Administration was 
active in seeking opportunities for climate policy across 
the federal administrative states. 
There are also forces operating in the private 
sector to address climate change. As we saw in the 
second section, there has been a real move by some 
corporations to reduce their carbon emissions and of-
ten emissions by their suppliers. Another way of mak-
ing climate policy robust is to shift the economics in 
favor of emission reductions. One effective technique 
is to help sustainable technologies reach scale through 
subsidies or marketing guarantees such as renewable 
portfolio standards. Supporting energy innovation is 
another way to drive the energy system toward great-
er sustainability. Research and development of new 
technologies may bring down costs, allowing market-
driven emissions reductions even when the political 
atmosphere becomes chilly. They may also encourage 
more climate friendly policies in other jurisdictions or 
in the future of that particular jurisdiction by reducing 
the price of those policies.  
The Trump Administration is a dramatic illustra-
tion of the potential for backsliding and policy reversals 
in the long-term campaign against climate change. Going 
forward, it will be important to design policies and insti-
tutions that are as robust as possible in order to survive 
potential attacks by populist or conservative leaders. In 
the meantime, many in the United States will be working 
hard to resist Trump’s initiatives and maintain forward 
progress where possible.
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